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The economic well-being of most U.S. farm households depends on income from both
onfarm and off-farm activities. Consequently, for many farm households, economic
decisions (including technology adoption and other production decisions) are likely to
be shaped by the allocation of managerial time among such activities.  While time allo-
cation decisions are usually not measured directly, we observe the outcomes of such
decisions, such as onfarm and off-farm income.  This report finds that a farm operator’s
off-farm employment and off-farm income vary inversely with the size of the farm.
Operators of smaller farm operations improve their economic performance by compen-
sating for the scale disadvantages of their farm business with more off-farm involve-
ment. Off-farm work reduces farm-level technical efficiency, but increases
household-level technical efficiency.  And adoption of agricultural innovations that save
managerial time is associated with higher off-farm income.
Keywords: Off-farm income, farm households, economic performance, managerial time,
scale economies, scope economies, technical efficiency, technology adoption, farm size.
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U.S. farmers must make a host of decisions relating to their farms’ opera-
tion, including what to grow, when to grow it, in what quantities, and by
what methods. Often overlooked in this calculation, but factoring heavily in
the diversity of U.S. farms and farm households, is the fact that most opera-
tors split their time between farm and nonfarm activities. Large farms are
typically able to economize on inputs and better coordinate stages of
production. Smaller farms, though often unprofitable from a farm business
perspective, have endured by being part of household enterprises that
combine farm and off-farm activities. Their operators’ onfarm decisions,
from choice of technology to choice of specialty, are often influenced by
off-farm commitments and income. 
What Is the Issue? 
Onfarm and off-farm activities compete for limited managerial time (mainly
of the operator and spouse). How farm operator households allocate their
time largely affects production decisions (such as technology adoption),
economic performance, and the household’s economic well-being. 
The extent of off-farm work and its relationship with farm economic
performance may have important policy implications. For example, govern-
ment policies for agriculture (via conservation, research and development,
extension, and commodity programs) may affect farm households differ-
ently, depending on the relative importance of onfarm versus off-farm
income. And the effectiveness of policies promoting adoption of farm tech-
nologies might be improved by taking into account the different demands on
managerial time and the relative ability of the farm household to accommo-
date those demands. 
What Did the Study Find? 
Operators of smaller farms typically participate more in off-farm
employment, work more hours off the farm, and have higher off-farm
income than operators of larger farms. In 2004, farm households with
farm sales less than $10,000 had average off-farm earned income of
$54,600, while households with farm sales of $500,000 – $1 million aver-
aged only $30,100. More than 58 percent of operators with farm sales less
than $10,000 reported off-farm hours worked in 2004, versus less than 20
percent for operators of farms with sales of $500,000-$1 million.
As previous studies have shown, off-farm work is less likely on farms
with labor-intensive enterprises such as dairy.  Moreover, dairy farmers
who do work off the farm tend to require higher compensation to do so than
farmers producing other commodities.  Off-farm work has also been shown
to be positively related to urban proximity and to the education and experi-
ence of the operator and spouse. 
Including off-farm income-generating activities improves the overall
economic performance of the farm household. Off-farm income clearly
adds to total household income, but it can also improve efficiency and other
iii
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soybean farms show that households engaged in off-farm income-generating
activities together with the production of traditional farm outputs have cost
savings of 24 percent relative to carrying out those activities separately. The
savings likely arise from the sharing of managerial expertise (and its many
components, such as accounting and information processing skills, sales
expertise, administrative and technical know-how, etc.) between onfarm and
off-farm activities.  For example, management skills acquired in farming
might be applicable to (and shared with) a nonfarm business, and vice-versa.
From a farm business perspective, operators of smaller farms have a greater
incentive to expand. However, from a household perspective (including off-
farm income-generating activities), operators of small farms have a reduced
tendency to increase their farm size.  
Large farms are generally more efficient than smaller farms in trans-
forming farm inputs into outputs, given the technology at their disposal.
But focusing on farm inputs and outputs alone is misleading because off-
farm income-generating activities are increasingly important in determining
economic performance of the farm household.
When off-farm activities are included, farm household-level efficiencies are
higher than farm-level efficiencies across all farm sizes, and efficiency gains
from integrating off-farm work into the output portfolio are relatively
greatest for smaller farms.   As a result, household-level efficiencies of
smaller farms are comparable to farm-level efficiencies of larger farms.
This suggests that households operating small farms have partially adapted
to shortfalls in farm-level performance by increasing their off-farm income.
In addition to its links with the farm business, as traditionally exam-
ined, farmers’ technology choices are closely related to off-farm income.
Higher off-farm income is significantly related to the adoption of technolo-
gies that economize on management time (management saving such as
herbicide-tolerant crops, conservation tillage).  For example, a 16-percent
increase in off-farm household income is associated with a 10-percent
increase in the probability of adopting herbicide-tolerant (HT) soybeans.
Household income from onfarm sources is not significantly associated with
adoption of these technologies, but total household income (including
income from off-farm sources) is.   On the other hand, lower off-farm
income is significantly related to adoption of managerially intensive tech-
nologies (such as precision farming).  For example, an 8-percent decrease in
off-farm income is associated with a 10-percent increase in the probability
of adopting yield monitors, a key component of precision agriculture.
These findings corroborate a tradeoff between household/operator time
spent in onfarm and off-farm activities.  Households operating small farms
devote more time to off-farm opportunities and are more likely to adopt
management-saving technologies. 
iv
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To examine the relationships between off-farm income, farm and household
characteristics, and economic performance of U.S. farm households, we
developed econometric models and estimated them using USDA’s Agricul-
tural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data for several years (1996-
2001). To examine the relationship between off-farm work and economic
performance of farm households (including economies of scale and scope,
and economic efficiency), we compared estimates obtained using traditional
farm-level models to estimates obtained using household-level models
(including off-farm income-generating activities along with traditional farm
outputs such as crops and livestock).  To examine the relationship between
off-farm income and technology adoption, we developed a model that incor-
porates the adoption decision into the agricultural household framework. We
examined the interaction of off-farm work and adoption of agricultural tech-
nologies of varying managerial intensity, including herbicide-tolerant crops,
precision agriculture, conservation tillage, and Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis)
corn, after controlling for other factors. 
v
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Introduction and Overview
Decisionmakers (mainly farm operators and their spouses) are a major
determinant of farms’ economic performance.  The effort and ability to
manage land, water, machinery, and other inputs— as well as adoption of
technologies and production practices—can help secure farm business
success and the economic well-being of a farm household. However, many
farm operators (and other household members) use a large share of their
time in off-farm income-generating activities. Consequently, for many farm
households, economic decisions (including technology adoption and other
production decisions) are likely to shape and be shaped by the allocation of
managerial time to such activities.  While time allocation decisions are
usually not measured directly, we observe the outcomes of such decisions,
such as onfarm and off-farm income.  
Off-farm income (largely earned income from employment and off-farm
business income) received by U.S. farm operators and their spouses has
risen steadily over recent decades and now constitutes the largest component
of farm household income (fig. 1a, b). The impact of off-farm income is felt
particularly by households operating small farms, allowing many of them to
survive and even flourish to an extent not thought possible 20 or 30 years
ago (Gardner, 2005).  In addition, the growth in off-farm income over the
last 40 years reduced income inequality among farm households and helped
U.S. farmers’ average incomes overtake those of the nonfarm population
(Gardner, 2002).
This report examines the empirical relationships between off-farm income,
farm household characteristics, production decisions (particularly tech-
nology adoption), and various measures of economic performance for U.S.
farm households.  This research provides insights into farmers’ choices in
the context of farm/household integration and helps improve our under-
Figure1a
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Sources: USDA, ERS. Deflator used to calculate real income is the consumer price
index (CPI-U) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Real off-farm income
Real onfarm incomestanding of the pace of technological innovation and its relation to the struc-
ture of agriculture.
The report also suggests the need to analyze the economics of the farm busi-
ness and farm household in an integrated framework and describes two
approaches for doing so.  We summarize statistics of off-farm work and
income in U.S. farm households and examine the relationship between off-
farm income and farm size, location, and household characteristics.  
Our main research focus is to examine how off-farm work influences the
economic performance of the integrated farm business and household.  To
do this, we expand traditional concepts of economic performance, such as
economies of scale and efficiency, to incorporate onfarm and off-farm
income-generating activities of household members.  In addition, we
examine the relationship between off-farm income and the adoption of agri-
cultural technologies of varying managerial intensity, namely herbicide-
tolerant crops, precision agriculture, conservation tillage, and Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) corn.  
An Integrated Approach
While increasing household income, off-farm activities also compete for
managerial time (mainly of farm operators and their spouses), which may
affect the economic performance of the farm business.  Consequently,
economic decisions (including technology adoption and other production
decisions) are likely to shape and be shaped by the underlying allocation of
time within the farm operator household.  So, rather than examining the
farm business or farm household in isolation, an integrated approach
captures the interplay of farm and nonfarm considerations and contributions. 
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Figure 1b
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Sources: 1960-2003: USDA farm household income estimates over time, ERS farm structure
briefing room, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmStructure/Data/historic.htm; 2004:
Covey et al., 2005.3
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Despite its importance, the role of off-farm income has been largely
neglected in empirical analyses of farm economic performance and tech-
nology adoption.1 Some exceptions include Gardner (2001), Boisvert
(2002), Goodwin and Mishra (2004), Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2005),
Nehring et al. (2005), Paul and Nehring (2005), and Chavas et al. (2005).2
One reason for this lack of studies may be the modeling and data challenges
in moving from the traditional unit of analysis (the farm business) to the
farm household.  
While agricultural economists have made major contributions in under-
standing farm production functions, they may not have exploited as fully the
concept of the household production function (Offutt, 2002). In this context,
the allocation of time (and money) of household members to production,
consumption, and other activities is particularly important.  An integrated
firm-household perspective was suggested back in 1952 by E.O. Heady,
who observed that “the firm-household complex is important not only to
defining the organization of resources and family activities which will maxi-
mize utility at a given point in time but also in helping to explain uncer-
tainty precautions, capital accumulation, soil conservation, and other
production-consumption decisions, which relate to time.”3
Approaches To Integrate Off-Farm Work
and Farm Production
Two approaches are used in this report to model the interaction of off-farm
income-generating activities with traditional farm production activities. The
unifying notion underlying the two approaches is that managerial time is a
key resource in both onfarm and off-farm activities. 
In one approach, we expand the agricultural household model to include the
technology adoption decision together with the off-farm work decisions by the
operator and spouse. The agricultural household model describes how a farm
household allocates its time (and other resources) among producing commodi-
ties, earning off-farm income, leisure, and home production.4  The model
assumes that the farm household maximizes its utility subject to constraints on
its time (including work and leisure), income, and production technology
(production function). Household members derive utility from goods
purchased for consumption, leisure, and factors exogenous to current house-
hold decisions, such as human capital, household characteristics, and weather.
Using this model, we examine the interaction of off-farm work and the adop-
tion of agricultural innovations (both management saving like herbicide-
tolerant crops, and management using like precision agriculture or integrated
pest management—IPM), then obtain empirical estimates of the relationship
between adoption of these technologies and farm household income.  
Though the agricultural household model has intuitive appeal in modeling
farm household behavior, it requires much in the way of assumptions and
data (Offutt, 2002). Parameter estimation for the models spawned by the
household production function often requires hard-to-get data, including
consumption expenditures, farm and off-farm labor supply, farm and
nonfarm outputs and inputs, assets, and prices for all goods, inputs, and
labor. Also needed is information on technologies and participation in
2Boisvert (2002) stressed not only
the growing links between farming
activities and off-farm labor markets
but also the links between farm house-
hold activities, conservation payments,
and agricultural pollution.
3Loosely, utility is a measure of sat-
isfaction. Economists assume that peo-
ple act if doing so gives them utility. 
1Economic researchers have been
examining farm economic performance
focusing on the farm business for sev-
eral decades (Heady; Griliches;
Dawson and Hubbard; Hallam).
Another line of research has focused
on the farm household and the labor
allocation decisions by the operator
and their spouses (Huffman, 1980,
1991; Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg,
1989; Lass and Gempesaw, 1992;
Kimhi, 1994, 2004).
4The household model initially
received a great deal of attention in
studies of developing countries’ agri-
culture because of the relative impor-
tance of consumption activities in such
households.  Agricultural economists
have also applied these models in
developed countries to examine how
household members make decisions
about the allocation of labor both on
and off the farm (Huffman, 1980,
1991; Sumner, 1982; Lopez, 1985;
Singh et al., 1986; Lass et al., 1989;
Lass and Gempesaw, 1992; Kimhi,
1994, 2004; Mishra and Goodwin,
1997; Goodwin and Holt, 2002).  Other
analysts have examined income and
wealth distributions and links between
income instability and
consumption/investment (El-Osta and
Morehart; Mishra and Morehart).
Lopez is one of the few to have consid-
ered labor supply and farm production
decisions simultaneously.  In a very
recent application, Chavas et al. used a
farm household model to investigate
the economic efficiency of farm house-
holds in Gambia (Chavas et al., 2005).4
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government programs, as well as demographic data.  For these reasons, it is
sometimes necessary to use alternative methods. In this approach, we
expand the concept of scope economies to include as output all income-
generating activities, on or off the farm, in addition to the traditional farm
outputs such as corn, soybeans, and livestock (Nehring et al., 2005). In addi-
tion, we estimate scale economies and technical efficiency, and compare
results at the farm and household levels. 
Scale Economies 
A farm is said to have economies of scale (or
increasing returns to scale) if the average cost declines
as output (scale of production) increases. If a farm is
subject to economies of scale, it is cost effective for
that farm to increase all outputs simultaneously while
holding the mix of outputs constant (costs would rise
less than proportionally).  Thus, the existence of scale
economies suggests that farms can achieve lower
average costs by becoming larger.  Economists have
established (under reasonable conditions) the equiva-
lence between the information provided by the costs
and the production technology (Carlton and Perloff,
2000).  Based on the production technology, economies
of scale may be viewed from an output or input
perspective. 
From an output perspective, the term elasticity of scale
is used to measure the percent increase in output gener-
ated by a 1-percent increase in all inputs (Varian,
1992). There are increasing returns to scale if the elas-
ticity is greater than 1; that is, an increase in overall
inputs generates a more than proportionate increase in
output. For example, a scale elasticity of 1.15 means
that a 1-percent increase in inputs leads to a 1.15-
percent increase in output. Conversely, if the elasticity
is lower than one there are decreasing returns to scale;
that is, an increase in overall inputs generates a less
than proportionate increase in output. For example, a
scale elasticity of 0.8 means that a 1-percent increase in
inputs leads to a 0.8-percent increase in output.
Constant returns to scale means that a 1-percent
increase in overall inputs generates a 1-percent increase
in output; in this case the elasticity of scale is equal to
1.  
From an input perspective, a similarly defined scale
elasticity measures the percent increase in inputs
required to support a 1-percent increase in all outputs.
In this case, returns to scale are increasing when the
input-oriented scale elasticity is less than one. For
example, if the scale elasticity of a farm is 0.75, it
means that a 0.75-percent increase in inputs will be
needed to support an output increase of 1 percent.  This
suggests that there is an incentive for the farm to grow
larger. If the elasticity is equal to one (constant returns
to scale), there are no scale economies available.   In
this report, we use an input perspective (input distance
function, appendix 1).
Technical Efficiency
Economic efficiency can be decomposed into technical
efficiency and allocative efficiency. A farm is techni-
cally efficient if it uses the minimum possible levels of
inputs to produce a given level of output, given the
technology.  An allocative efficient farm produces a
given output using the best (minimum cost) input
proportions given prevailing input prices.  Unless speci-
fied otherwise, the efficiency results discussed in this
report involve technical efficiency.
Technical efficiency is the ratio of current to maximum
possible or “best practice” production and it is calcu-
lated in this study using an input distance function (see
appendix 1).   Technical efficiency is defined relative to
an “efficient frontier” and all farms operating on the
efficient frontier are classified as 100 percent efficient
with an efficiency score equal to 1. Farms using more
inputs to produce a given output level than those on the
efficient frontier are inefficient and their efficiency
score is less than 1. Technical efficiency is often associ-
ated with managerial ability and experience.
Scale and Efficiency 5
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Off-Farm Work and Income
in U.S. Farm Households
Off-farm income received by farm operators and their spouses has risen
steadily over recent decades (fig. 1a) as job opportunities have grown and
technological progress, such as mechanization, has lessened onfarm labor
needs. The off-farm income share of total household income of U.S. farmers
rose from about 50 percent in 1960 to more than 80 percent over the past 10
years (fig. 1b).  Most of the off-farm income was earned.  On average, a
farm household earned about $48,800 from off-farm sources in 2004,
received about $18,500 in unearned income (Social Security, interest, etc),
and netted nearly $14,200 from farming activities (Covey et al., 2005).5
Fifty-two percent of farm operators worked off farm in 2004 (up from 44
percent in 1979).  The share of spouses working off farm grew from 28
percent of spouses in 1979 to 45 percent in 2004 (Mishra et al., 2002; 2004
ARMS data).
The trend is similar in terms of hours worked (table 1).  Average hours
worked off farm by farm operators has increased (from 830 hours per year
in 1996 to 1,022 in 2004), while the hours devoted to farm work did not
change markedly (1,525 hours in 1996 and 1,574 in 2004). Similarly, the
number of hours worked off the farm by spouses increased from 690 in
1996 to 809 in 2004. 
Farmers’ Motivations To Work Off Farm
Once seen as a “temporary response to the Great Depression,” off-farm
employment is now regarded as a “regular feature of almost all farming
societies” (Fuller, 1991; Bartlett, 1986; Bessant, 2000).  More than half of
U.S. farm operators now work off the farm.6 Moreover, off-farm income
appears to smooth out household income flows (Mishra and Goodwin,
1997; Mishra and Sandretto, 2002), and most farmers view off-farm
employment as a permanent rather than a temporary or transitional (into or
out of farming) pursuit (Ahearn and El-Osta, 1993).7 Farm operators in a
1982 survey felt that full-time farming provided inadequate income (91
percent of the respondents), and that farm income was risky (70 percent)
and offered no fringe benefits such as pensions and health insurance (55
percent).  Capital and land constraints were considered less important disad-
vantages to full-time farming (42 and 30 percent) (Barlett, 1991).  More
Table 1
Operator and spouse hours worked on and off farm,1996-2004
Item 1996 2000 2004
Operator hours worked: 
On farm 1,525 1,433 1,547
Off farm 830 1,011 1,022
Total2 , 355 2,443 2,596
Spouse hours worked: 
On farm 366 337 877
Off farm 690 751 809
Total 1,056 1,0891 , 6 86
Sources: 1996: Hoppe (2001, p. 29); 2000: Mishra et al. (2002, p. 50); 2004: ARMS data.
5Across all farms, operators earned
64 percent of all household off-farm
earned income in 2001, spouses earned
close to 33 percent, and other members
earned 3 percent (O’Donoghue and
Hoppe, 2005).
6There are, however, some issues
regarding the definition of a farm.
Since the USDA definition of a farm is
not adjusted for inflation, the number
of small operations that get defined as
farms may increase over time, which
may also increase the share of opera-
tors working off the farm. 
7A minority of farmers (18.4 per-
cent of the total in 1987) may be con-
sidered as a transitional group, i.e.,
full-time farmers who worked off farm
because they faced heavy losses and
high debts. Some of these farmers
expected to return to full-time farming
when their financial situation was
resolved (Bartlett, 1991).  Moreover,
using agricultural census data spanning
1982 to 1997, ERS researchers identi-
fied 644 (out of over 5,000) small part-
time farms that managed to grow into
large commercial operations.  These
farms are called emergent adaptive
farms (EAF).  Off-farm work provided
financial support during the early years
of the typical EAF, but EAF operators
spent more time on farm activities as
their businesses expanded: 35 percent
of EAF operators worked at least 200
days off the farm in 1987, but that
share declined to 16 percent by 1997
(Newton, 2005).recently, the 2004 ARMS asked operators and spouses to list the two main
reasons for seeking off-farm work.  The primary reason given by 35-50
percent of the operators and 44-63 percent of the spouses (depending on
farm size and occupation of the farm operator) was “to increase income” of
the farm household. Other reasons cited were to obtain fringe benefits (such
as health insurance) and personal satisfaction (Covey et al., 2005).  
So most operators and spouses report working off farm primarily to increase
income for the farm household, but how was the additional income used?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, most farm operators and spouses did not
work off the farm to directly support their farm business. USDA surveys
indicate reasons unrelated to the farm business, from buying groceries to
funding a retirement account (Hoppe, 2001).
Farmers and spouses hold a variety of off-farm jobs, but especially in
private businesses (54.1 percent of operators with off-farm jobs), self-
employment (22.3 percent), and government (16.0 percent).  Only 3.3
percent worked on another farm (Mishra et al., 2002).  Spouses with off-
farm work are most likely to be employed in the private sector (55.1
percent) and government (28.4 percent), with less than 1 percent working on
another farm.
Opportunity Cost of Labor for Farm Operators 
Opportunity cost is an important economic concept that measures the
economic cost of an action or decision in terms of what is given up (oppor-
tunity forgone) to carry out that action.  In the case of farm labor, for
example, the opportunity cost of labor for the operator (or spouse) labor is
often measured in terms of the wage that the operator (or spouse) can obtain
working off farm. As the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Europe
notes: “In conventional accounting systems, ‘unpaid’ family labour does not
usually appear as an explicit cost of production. Consequently, there is no
explicit ‘wage’ paid to the labour that the farmer and his family [contribute
to] production.”
Farm household labor is a critical input in agricultural production. In the
corn/soybean-producing States, farm household members provide more than
80 percent of all labor hours.8 A significant proportion of those labor hours
is not valued directly in the marketplace (e.g., through wages).  Studies have
estimated the opportunity costs of farm labor by using predicted off-farm
wages (El-Osta and Ahearn, 1996). 
Alternatively, a simplified approximation of the opportunity cost of labor for
farm operators and their spouses can be obtained directly from ARMS data.
The (nominal) opportunity costs for corn/soybean operators and spouses
appear not to have increased over 1996-2000. The cost for the operator
($21.07 per hour for 2000) appears to run about 20 percent higher than that of
the spouse, and both are higher than the actual wage rate for hired farm labor.9
It is also interesting to compare the opportunity cost of labor for
corn/soybean farmers with those of dairy farmers.  The cost for U.S. dairy
farmers in 2000 was econometrically estimated at $27.58 per hour for oper-
6
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8Corn/soybean-producing States are
defined as those that account for most
of the U.S corn and soybean produc-
tion.  States included are Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
9The opportunity cost of labor
varies with the farm’s region, size, and
specialization, the operator’s human
capital (education and experience); and
household characteristics (El–Osta and
Ahearn).  In addition, opportunity cost
estimates may vary with the character-
istics of the labor markets, the method-
ology used, and data sources.ators (30 percent higher than for corn/soybean farmers) and $19.36 for
spouses (18 percent higher) (Lovell and Mosheim, 2005).  Given that labor
requirements in dairy production are high and inflexible (El-Osta and
Ahearn), dairy farmers likely require a higher “wage” to work off the farm
than farmers working in other enterprises.
7
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Table 2
Opportunity cost of labor for corn/soybean farm operators and spous-
es, and actual hired farm wage rate, 1996-2000   
Year      Operator      Spouse Hired
Dollars per hour
1996      22.88       17.87     7.42    
1997      26.72       19.06      8.01   
1998       22.14       18.77      8.30  
1999       22.19       17.96      8.67    
2000       21.07       17.47      8.99
Source: ERS estimates based on ARMS data for corn/soybean States 
analyzed (Nehring, Fernandez-Cornejo, and Banker, 2005).Off-Farm Income and Farm/Household
Characteristics
Like their nonfarm counterparts, many farm households are dual career.
While operators and spouses across all sizes and typologies work off-farm or
manage nonfarm businesses, the level of off-farm income varies with farm
size, region, farm type, and the human capital of operators and spouses.
Off-Farm Income and Farm Size
Off-farm income varies inversely with farm size; operators of smaller farms
have higher off-farm incomes, both earned and total.10 Farm households
with gross farm sales less than $10,000 had total off-farm income averaging
nearly $74,000 in 2004 ($54,600 of which was earned), while households
with farm sales between $250,000 and $499,999 had total off-farm income
averaging about $45,000 ($33,200 earned) (table 3).  While off-farm income
constitutes the largest component of farm household income on average, its
share decreases with farm size.  For farms with gross sales higher than
$250,000 (less than 8 percent of U.S. farms), off-farm income is no longer
the largest component of household income (table 4).
Off-farm household income earned by the operators is more variable across
farm sizes ($27,500 for operators of smaller farms versus less than $10,000
for operators of the largest farms) than that earned by spouses (between
$12,000 and $14,000 across all sizes in 2004).  Off-farm income earned by
other household members averages around $1,000.  
To a large extent, the inverse relationship between off-farm earned income
and farm size is due to greater off-farm employment (and more hours
worked off the farm) by operators of smaller farms.  More than 55 percent
of operators with farm sales less than $100,000 reported off-farm hours in
2004 versus 20 percent or less for operators of farms with sales above
$250,000 (table 4).  On the other hand, off-farm income earned by farm
operators who work off-farm does not vary much with size, averaging
$47,000 for operators of the smallest farms and $39,000 for operators of the
largest farms. 
8
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10Smaller farms represent a very
large share of farm population but a
small share of the farm sales. For
example, about 44 percent of the farms
have sales less than $10,000 and more
than 80 percent of the farms have sales
below $100,000 (table 3).  This distri-
bution, however, is dependent on the
definition of farm.  In the United
States, a farm is currently defined, for
statistical purposes, “as any place from
which $1,000 or more of agricultural
products were sold or normally would
have been sold during the year under
consideration.” (USDA, 2005). 
Table 3
Off-farm household income by farm size, 2004
Income Income Income Off-farm Total Unearned Total
Farm salesS hare   earned earned     earned by   business earned income off-farm
of by the   by the     other    income income income
farms operator   spousem e m bers
Percent ——————————————— Dollars ———————————————
$9,999 or less 4 3.7 27,457 14,756  1,219 11,209 54,641 19,392 74,033
$10,000-$99,999 40.7 24,295  13,095 1,142  9,8894 8,422 19,549 67,971
$100,000-$249,999 7.9 11,074  14,722 1,158  8,493  35,445 11,467 46,913
$250,000-$499,999 4.2 7,559  13,439 836 11,404 33,238 11,633 44,870
$500,000-$999,999 2.0 7,790 12,816     1,110  8,371 30,086 21,991 52,077
$1,000,000 or more  1.5 4,898 12,017  612 10,744 28,271 12,811 41,082 
All farms 100.0 23,318 1 3,943 1,156 10,402 48,818 18,461 67,279
Source: 2004 ARMS data.9
Off-Farm Income, Technology Adoption, and Farm Economic Performance/ERR-36
Economic Research Service/USDA
Table 4
Farm household income by farm size, 2004
Farm size Number of  Share of  Total Income Share of Off-farm
(annual sales)f arms farms household from farm income 
income farming income
Number Percent Dollars Dollars Percent Dollars
$9,999 or less 901,333 43.7 71,155 -2,878 -8.9 74,033
$10,000-$99,999  838,912 40.7 72,061 4,091 11.7 67,971
$100,000-$249,999 162,7827 . 9 80,912 33,999 18.9 46,913
$250,000-$499,999  86,087 4.2 124,386 79,516 23.4 44,870
$500,000-$999,999 41,424 0.2.0 168,844 116,766 16.5 52,077
$1,000,000 or more  30,284 1.5 411,266 370,184 38.3 41,082
All farms 2,060,822 100.0 81,480 14,201 100.0 67,279
Share of  Off-farm Off-farm Share of Off-farm Off-farm
Farm size Earned operators e arned earned  spouses income earned
(annual sales) off-farm   reporting income by income of  reporting earned by income of
income off-farm operators operators off-farm   spousess pouses
hours who worked hours   who worked 
off-farm 
Dollars Percent Dollars Dollars Percent Dollars Dollars
$9,999 or less 54,641 58.7 27,457 46,775 44.1 14,756 33,460
$10,000-$99,999 48,422 55.5 24,295 43,775 45.5 13,095 28,780
$100,000-$249,999  35,445 31.1 11,074 35,608 54.4 14,722 27,063
$250,000-$499,999  33,238 20.4 7,559 37,054 45.2 13,439 29,732
$500,000-$999,999  30,0861 8.6 7,790 41,882 44.8 12,816 28,607
$1,000,000 or more  28,271 12.6 4,8983 8 ,8733 7.2 12,017 32,304
All farms 48,818 52.1 23,318 44,756 45.4 13,9433 0,711
Source: 2004 ARMS data.10
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11The tradeoff between time spent
in onfarm and off-farm activities also
manifests itself in Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) participation.
Boisvert and Chang (2006) found
empirical evidence that a household’s
decision to participate in the CRP and
to work off the farm are made jointly
rather than independently.
Participation in off-farm work with
higher wages provides an incentive for
operators to work less on the farm and
to take land out of production and
commit it to the CRP.  As a result, par-
ticipation in the CRP and off-farm
work increase household income. 
The inverse relationship between farm size and off-farm work still holds
after controlling for other factors, as demonstrated econometrically by many
researchers (Lass et al., 1989, 1991; Yee et al., 2004).  In addition, Goodwin
and Bruer (2003) and Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2005) showed that the
inverse relationship holds for both operator and spouse.
Time allocation between onfarm and off-farm activities by household
members appears to be the underlying reason for the inverse relationship
between farm size and off-farm work.  This relationship appears to be valid
regardless of the sequence in which time is allocated between farm and off-
farm work. As Olfert (1984) notes, it may be the case that farmers choose
farm size and type  after knowing the time commitments required by an off-
farm job, or farmers may choose the type and amount of off-farm work after
taking into account the nature of the labor requirements on the farm.11
Off-Farm Income and Farm Location 
Off-farm employment also varies geographically, with widely differing
shares of off-farm income (to total income) even within States (fig. 2).  In
general, high ratios of off-farm earned income to total income are exhibited
in the four regions—the Northeast, Appalachian, Southern Plains, and
Northwest—where job opportunities tend to be highest or farm income low-
est. In many cases, one family member may focus on the farm operation
while the spouse and children work off the farm. In other situations, the
farm operation may be a side job and a refuge from urban stress.
The supply of off-farm labor has been shown to be positively related to
urban proximity (Lass et al., 1991).  Moreover, Gardner (2001) found that
farmers’ income growth is inversely related to the rural share of a State’s
population. Gardner observed that this finding supports Schultz’s (1950)
hypothesis that “a larger presence of nonfarm people in a State is good for
Figure 2
The importance of off-farm income by ASD*, 2001







*ASD = Agricultural Statistics District.
Source: 2001 ARMS data.11
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the growth of farmers’ incomes, because it increases their off-farm earnings
opportunities and increases the demand for the goods and services that
farmers produce.”  This may be particularly true for agricultural States with
large urban populations such as Texas, where off-farm opportunities
increase near one of that State’s four major cities—Dallas-Fort Worth,
Houston, San Antonio, and Austin.   
Off-Farm Income, Type of
Enterprise, and Human Capital
Off-farm work is less likely on farms with labor-intensive enterprises such
as dairy (Leistritz et al., 1985) and other livestock (Lass et al., 1991;
Goodwin and Bruer, 2003).  Moreover, dairy farmers who do work off the
farm tend to require higher “wages” (the opportunity cost of labor is higher)
to work off farm than farmers working in other enterprises.
The supply of off-farm labor has also been shown to be positively related to
human capital such as education and experience of the operator and spouse
(Lass et al., 1991).  The number of children is positively associated with off-
farm employment for farm men, but the association is negative for farm
women. More children may imply more need for additional income but also
additional child care at home.12
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Off-Farm Work, Scale and Scope
Economies, and Efficiency
The importance of off-farm income to all U.S. farmers is widely acknowl-
edged, and the relative dedication to off-farm work is related to farm size,
location, specialty, and operator characteristics.  However, is off-farm
work actually helping farm households in general, and those operating
small farms in particular, to improve their economic performance?  Since
scale and scope economies, as well as economic efficiency, are key
concepts used by economists to examine economic performance, this
section introduces those concepts as they relate to off-farm work.
A farm is said to have economies of scale (or increasing returns to scale)
if the average cost of production declines as output (scale of production)
increases (see box, p. 4). This decline in per-unit costs as output increases
suggests that smaller farms can achieve cost advantages by becoming
larger. The concept of economies of scale is an important one.  For
example, farms with lower average costs are better able to cope with
higher input prices (Kumbhakar, 1993). On the other hand, increasing
returns to scale in production may lead to consolidation of firms with
potential effects on competition (Hallam, 1991).  
With multiple outputs, the measurement of scale economies becomes
more complicated. In addition to changes in costs that occur as output
expands, there are also changes in costs due to the product mix (Hallam,
1991).  If it is cheaper to produce several outputs in one operation than it
is to produce them in separate operations, economies of scope are said to
occur (see box, p. 14).
Off-Farm Work and Scale Economies
We estimated the scale economies for corn and soybean farms for 1996-
2000, from an input perspective.  Scale economies both at the farm level
(the measure traditionally reported) and at the household level (including
off-farm income-generating activities as an output) are considered. At the
farm level, the elasticity of scale ranges from about 0.56 for smaller farms
(gross sales less than $100,000), to about 0.8 for the larger farms (sales
greater than $500,000) (table 5).  This means that to support a 10-percent
increase in outputs, smaller farms would require a 5.6-percent increase in
all inputs, while larger farms would require an 8-percent increase in
inputs.  Thus, the greater scale economies available for smaller operations
provide a major inducement to increase farm size (compared with the
larger farms whose scale elasticities are closer to 1).
However, at the household level, with off-farm income-generating activi-
ties included, the scale economies available are lower (scale elasticity is
closer to 1; that is, closer to constant returns to scale). Thus, the scale
elasticity is higher for all sizes, ranging from 0.73 to 0.96 (table 5). So for
smaller farms, a 10-percent increase in all outputs requires a 7.3-percent
increase in inputs, while larger farms require a 9.6-percent increase in
inputs.12 More importantly, the difference between the scale elasticities at
the household and farm levels is larger for the smaller farms (30 percent)
12The scale elasticity increases
(moves closer to constant returns
to scale) when off-farm income is
included because of the theoreti-
cal relationship between scale
and scope economies in multi-
product firms: “the presence of
scope economies ‘magnifies’ the
extent of overall economies of
scale beyond what would result
from a simple weight sum of
product specific economies of
scale” (Baumol et al., 1982).13
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than for the larger farms (around 20 percent).  Thus, households operating
smaller farms may compensate for the scale disadvantages of their farm
business activities with the advantages of off-farm income-generating activi-
ties.  This advantage may also support the notion that integrated farm and
nonfarm labor markets are enabling many small farms to survive and
flourish to an extent not thought possible three decades ago (Gardner, 2005).
Off-Farm Work and Economies of Scope
Scope economies measure the cost savings due to simultaneous production
of outputs relative to the cost of separate production (see box, p. 14). The
concept of economies of scope is useful in assessing the advantages of
output diversification. Given the importance of off-farm income to U.S. farm
households, scope economies may be expanded to include as output any
income-generating activities on or off the farm (household-level scope
economies) (see appendix 1).13 Our estimates for corn and soybean farms
show substantial household-level scope economies, 0.24 on average. This
means that farm households engaged in off-farm income-generating activi-
ties together with the production of traditional farm outputs have cost
savings of 24 percent relative to carrying out those activities separately.14
The cost savings are likely to arise from the sharing of managerial expertise
(of the operator and spouse) between onfarm and off-farm activities.
Economic evaluations of the farm business alone, then, provide an incom-
plete view because they exclude off-farm activities, which are an important
means of output diversification.
13Farms that produce the two out-
put groups separately are those that
either produce conventional outputs
and no off-farm income or else gener-
ate off-farm income but no conven-
tional outputs. While our sample
includes farm households that produce
conventional outputs with no off-farm
activities, it technically does not
include households with zero tradi-
tional outputs.  However, the sample
does include many farm households
with very small revenues from tradi-
tional outputs because, for statistical
purposes, in the U.S., a farm is cur-
rently defined “as any place from
which $1,000 or more of agricultural
products were sold or normally would
have been sold during the year under
consideration” (USDA, 2005). We
consider five outputs (corn, soybeans,
other crops, livestock, and
operator/spouse off-farm labor) and
five inputs (hired labor, operator labor,
spouse labor, miscellaneous inputs,
and pesticides). The method of calcu-
lating scope economies, as well as the
underlying cost function, is shown in
appendix 1.
Table 5
Scale economies for corn/soybean farms, 1996-2000
Elasticity of scale 
Farm level Household level
(Excluding (Including off-
Farm type1 Gross sales off-farm farm income) 
income)
Farming occupation/ < $100,000 0.56 0.73
lower sales
Farming occupation/ $100,000-$249,999 0.74 0.88
medium sales
Large family farms $250,000-$499,999 0.77 0.94
Vary large family farms >$500,000 0.800 . 9 6
All farms 0.66 0.83
1Excluding limited-resource farms and retirement/residential farms. Limited-resource farms are
small farms with gross sales less than $100,000, total farm assets less than $150,000, and
total operator household income less than $20,000. Limited-resource farmers may report farm-
ing, a nonfarm occupation, or retirement as their major occupation.  Retirement/residential
farms are small farms whose operators report they are retired or engaged in a major occupa-
tion other than farming) (Hoppe et al., 1999)
Source: Nehring et al., 2005.
14This result is valid on the aver-
age, not necessarily for all the
corn/soybean farms studied.  For
example, it is not likely to be valid for
the largest farms in the sample (whose
operators are less likely to work off
the farm, table 4).  As shown in
appendix 1, the underlying cost func-
tion is a function of the output quanti-
ties (and, thus, gross sales), and so are
scope economies.  The values reported
here are calculated at the means of the
sample.14
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Scope Economies
Scope economies measure the total cost savings due to simultaneous
production of outputs relative to the costs of separate production (appendix
1).  Given scope economies, it is less costly to produce several outputs in
one operation than to produce each output in separate operations (or joint
production in one operation generates more output than separate production
in two different operations using the same resources).  An often-cited
example of scope economies is fast food outlets, where savings are obtained
by sharing storage, cooking facilities, and customer service in the produc-
tion of many food products.  In general, scope economies may arise from
the presence of public inputs or from sharing of imperfectly divisible quasi-
fixed inputs in the production of different goods (Fernandez-Cornejo et al.,
1992).  In our context, farm households achieve scope economies by diversi-
fying or pursuing off-farm activities in addition to the onfarm production of
traditional commodities.  
To illustrate the possible advantages of “producing” onfarm and off-farm
outputs in a farm household, we may use the example of a production possi-
bilities curve (often used in economics).  When the production possibilities
curve (ACB) is shaped as in the figure, it is advantageous to produce onfarm
and off-farm outputs together.  As the figure shows, total output produced by
a farm household at point C (a combination of onfarm and off-farm outputs)
is higher than output produced either at A or B (or a linear combination of
both, line AB) while using the same amount of resources.
Scope economies for farm households are likely to arise from the sharing of
managerial expertise (and its many components, such as accounting and
information processing skills, sales expertise, administrative and technical
know-how, etc.) between onfarm and off-farm activities.15 The expertise of
many farm operators and/or their spouses is used in off-farm jobs in private
businesses and Government, and in self-employment (Mishra et al., 2002). A
USDA survey shows that the largest share of off-farm work done by opera-
tors and their spouses is accounted by work in executive, administrative, and
managerial positions, service occupations, administrative support, and sales
(Covey et al., 2004). 
15As is well known, diminishing marginal labor productivity is a determinant in the allocation
of labor between onfarm and off-farm activities.  In addition, labor requirements for crop pro-
duction are often concentrated in very few months of the year.  Thus, the marginal productiv-
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Off-Farm Work and Efficiency
Technical efficiency measures how well a farm transforms inputs into
outputs given the technology at its disposal (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
Efficiency is of great importance to prevent the waste of resources. Techni-
cally inefficient farmers fail to produce the maximum attainable output with
the amount of inputs used, and therefore can increase output with the
existing level of inputs and available technology. 
Two types of technical efficiency are examined here: traditional (farm-level)
technical efficiency of the farm business in the production of commodities;
and technical efficiency at the household level, which considers both on-
and off-farm activities.16
Efficiency of the Farm Business 
Kumbhakar et al. (1989) examined the effect of off-farm income on farm-
level efficiency for dairy farmers. They reasoned that the larger the off-farm
component of the operator’s income, the less time the operator would spend
managing the farm, eroding farm-level efficiency.  Indeed, they found that
farm-level efficiency of Utah dairy farmers in 1985 was negatively related to
off-farm income and that the negative effect was strongest for the smallest
farms, which had the largest off-farm incomes.17 Fernandez-Cornejo (1992)
calculated that the farm-level technical efficiency of vegetable farms in
Florida was negatively related to off-farm work carried out by the operator.
Similar results were obtained by Aigner et al. (2003) for the farm-level effi-
ciency of U.S. corn farmers using 2001 data.  
More recently, Goodwin and Mishra (2004) analyzed the relationship
between farm-level efficiency and off-farm labor supply. With data collected
from 7,699 farms in USDA’s 2001 Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS), they used gross cash income (appendix table 1) over total
variable costs as an operational measure of farm-level economic efficiency.
Greater participation in off-farm labor markets was shown to be signifi-
cantly associated with lower farm-level efficiency. An additional 1,000
hours engaged in off-farm work would tend to lower the farm-level effi-
ciency ratio by 0.17 with respect to the mean, which was $1.93 of cash farm
income per dollar of variable cost.  This effect, while not large, was statisti-
cally and economically significant. Such findings support the notion hypoth-
esized by Smith (2002) that off-farm work may hinder “smart farming” and
confirm a negative relationship between farming efficiency and the supply
of labor to off-farm employment. As theory predicts, more efficient farmers
are less likely to work off the farm, reflecting the higher opportunity cost
for their labor.  Furthermore, the statistical tests performed by Goodwin and
Mishra suggest that off-farm labor supply and farm-level efficiency are
jointly determined.18
Household-Level Efficiency
Rather than estimating the influence of off-farm work on the efficiency of
the farm business, we estimated the household-level technical efficiency
(including on- and off-farm activities), compared it with farm-level effi-
16We have adopted the terminology
of “farm-level” and “household-level”
efficiency following a recent publica-
tion by Chavas et al. (2005).  Our ear-
lier terminology (as used in Nehring et
al., 2005) was less transparent.    
17In a subsequent article,
Kumbhakar (1993) showed that lower
efficiency is the main reason that small
farms are less profitable than medium
and large farms; another reason being
their higher returns to scale (lower
scale economies).
18There is a two-way relationship
between the two variables rather than a
cause-and-effect relationship (in eco-
nomic jargon, each variable is endoge-
nous to the other).ciency, and examined how those efficiencies vary with farm size. The tech-
nique used in this research isolates the best-practice farm within any size
class, and measures technical efficiency by how close other farms are, on
average, to the best-practice farms, which are assigned a technical efficiency
equal to 1 and said to be on the “frontier.” 19
At the farm level, technical efficiencies of corn/soybean farms increase with
size from 0.87 to 0.93 (table 6).20 However, technical efficiencies at the
household level (when off-farm income is included) are higher (around
0.95) and the measures of technical efficiency do not vary across size
groups.  Moreover, while the beneficial effect of off-farm income occurs at
all sizes, it is stronger for smaller farms, whose household-level efficiency
levels are comparable with the farm-level efficiencies of the larger farms.
This suggests that small corn/soybean farmers have adapted to shortfalls in
farm-level efficiency by increasing off-farm income.  
Also, the higher household-level efficiencies are consistent with the positive
scope economies found.  Both findings reflect the more efficient use of
resources at the household level, particularly the use of managerial labor
(operator and spouse) shared between onfarm and off-farm activities.
Moreover, as Smith (2002) observes, as farm operators and other household
members engage in off-farm activities, they have less time available for
farm management.  This may inhibit their adoption of management-inten-
sive agricultural innovations and lead to less efficient farming.
16
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19The analysis uses several econo-
metric techniques, including the esti-
mation of an input distance function
and stochastic frontier estimation
(appendix 1; Nehring et al., 2005) to
estimate technical efficiency at the
farm (excluding off-farm income-gen-
erating activities) and at the house-
hold level (including off-farm
income-generating activities).  Data
used were 1995-2003 survey data of
corn/soybean farms from 10 States
(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin), that
account for most U.S corn and soy-
bean production.
20A farm unit with an efficiency
score of 0.8 is said to be 80 percent as
efficient as the farms on the ‘frontier,”
i.e., the best performing farms in the
data set. 
Table 6
Technical efficiency of corn/soybean farms, 1996-2000
Technical efficiency scores
Farm level (excluding Household level 
off-farm income) (including off-
Farm type1  Gross sales ($) farm income) 
Farming occupation/ < $100,000 0.870 . 9 5
lower sales
Farming occupation/ $100,000-$249,999 0.91 0.95
medium sales
Large family farms $250,000-$499,999 0.91 0.95
Very large family farms > $500,000 0.93 0.95
All farms 0.91 0.95
1Excluding limited-resource and retirement/residential farms.
Source: Nehring et al., 200517
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Off-Farm Work and the Adoption
of Agricultural Innovations
Technological change has been acknowledged as a critical component of
productivity and economic growth (Solow, 1994; Griliches, 1995).  The
rapid adoption and diffusion of new technologies in U.S. agriculture has
sustained growth in agricultural productivity and ensured an abundance of
food and fiber (Huffman and Evenson, 1993).  Technological innovations
and their adoption have also changed the way farm households regard
employment choices (Binswanger, 1974, 1978). Labor-saving technologies,
in particular, have allowed farm household members to increase income by
seeking off-farm employment (Mishra et al., 2002).21
While profitability (i.e., the extent of yield increases and/or reduction in
input costs from an innovation relative to the costs of adoption and current
management practices) plays a key role in technology adoption, most
studies acknowledge that heterogeneity among farms and farm operators
often explains why not all farmers adopt an innovation in the short or long
run (Batte and Johnson, 1993; Feder and Umali, 1993; Khanna and
Zilberman, 1997; Lowenberg-DeBoer and Swinton, 1997; Rogers, 1961,
1995) (see box, “Factors Influencing Technology Adoption”).
Still, assessments of technology adoption using the traditional economic tools
pioneered by Griliches (1957) have proven insufficient to explain differing
adoption rates for many recent agricultural innovations.  The standard meas-
ures of farm (accounting) profits, such as net returns (to management), give an
incomplete picture of economic returns because they usually exclude the
value of management time (Smith, 2002).  For example, herbicide-tolerant
soybeans were rapidly adopted despite showing no significant advantage in
net returns over conventional soybeans.  On the other hand, adoption of tech-
nologies such as integrated pest management (IPM) has been rather slow
despite explicit economic and environmental advantages (Fernandez-Cornejo
and McBride, 2002; Smith, 2002).  This led to the hypothesis that adoption is
driven by “unquantified” advantages, such as simplicity and flexibility, which
translate into reduced managerial intensity, freeing time for other uses.  An
obvious use of managers’ time is off-farm employment. 
Off-Farm Work as a Factor in Early Studies
of Technology Adoption
Early studies of technology adoption viewed off-farm income as influ-
encing adoption of “conservation” practices by providing “supplemental
income” to finance conservation expenditures (Blase, 1960).  Ervin and
Ervin (1982), on the other hand, argued that “off-farm income could
reflect the need for supplemental income for family living expenses and
essential farm production expenses other than conservation and less time
to implement and maintain unfamiliar practices.”  Survey results on
farmers’ motivation to seek off-farm income and  their view of such
employment as permanent rather than temporary, suggest that motivation
is closer the view of Ervin and Ervin. 
21Off-farm employment was also
facilitated by economic growth in the
nonfarm economy, improved infra-
structure (communications and trans-
portation), as well as education level
of farm household members (Banker
and MacDonald, 2005).18
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Rural sociologists recognized early that essential
differences among farmers can explain why they do
not adopt an innovation at the same time.  In addition,
the characteristics (perceived or real) of an innovation
are widely known to influence the adoption decision
(Rogers, 1995; Batz et al., 1999).  Economists and
sociologists have made extensive contributions to the
literature on the adoption and diffusion of technolog-
ical innovations in agriculture (e.g., Griliches, 1957,
Feder et al., 1985; Rogers, 1962, 1995).  Such
research typically focuses on the long-term extent of
adoption and the factors that influence the adoption
decision.  
Farm Structure/Size 
A basic hypothesis regarding technology transfer is
that the adoption of an innovation will tend to take
place earlier on larger farms than on smaller farms.
Just et al. (1980) show that, given the uncertainty and
the fixed transaction and information costs associated
with innovations, there may be a critical lower limit on
farm size that prevents smaller farms from adopting.
As these costs increase, the critical size also increases.
It follows that innovations with large fixed transaction
and/or information costs are less likely to be adopted
by smaller farms.  However, Feder et al. (1985) point
out that lumpiness of technology can be offset by the
emergence of a service sector (i.e., custom service or
consultant).  Disentangling farm size from other
factors hypothesized to influence technology adoption
has been problematic. Feder et al. (1985) caution that
farm size may be a surrogate for other factors, such as
wealth, risk preferences, and access to credit, scarce
inputs, or information.   Moreover, access to credit is
related to farm size and land tenure because both
factors determine the potential collateral available to
obtain credit. 
Human Capital
The ability to adapt new technologies for use on the
farm clearly influences the adoption decision.  Most
adoption studies attempt to measure this trait through
operator age, formal education, or years of farming
experience (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1994).  More
years of education and/or experience is often hypothe-
sized to increase the probability of adoption whereas
increasing age reduces the probability.  Factors
inherent in the aging process or the lowered likelihood
of payoff from a shortened planning horizon over
which expected benefits can accrue would be deter-
rents to adoption (Barry et al., 1995; Batte and
Johnson, 1993).  Younger farmers tend to have more
education and are often hypothesized to be more
willing to innovate.  
Risk and Risk Preferences
In agriculture, the notion that technological innovations
are perceived to be more risky than traditional practices
has received considerable support in the literature.  Many
researchers argue that the perception of increased risk
inhibits adoption (Feder et al., 1985).  Hiebert (1974) and
Feder and O’Mara (1981) show that uncertainty declines
with learning and experience.  Innovators and other early
adopters are believed to be more inclined to take risks
than are the majority of farmers. 
Tenure
While several empirical studies support the hypothesis
that land ownership encourages adoption, the results
are not unanimous and the subject has been widely
debated (e.g., Feder et al., 1985).  For example,
Bultena and Hoiberg (1983) found no support for the
hypothesis that land tenure has a significant influence
on adoption of conservation tillage.  The apparent
inconsistencies in the empirical results are due to the
nature of the innovation.  Land ownership is likely to
influence adoption if the innovation requires invest-
ments tied to the land.  Presumably, tenants are less
likely to adopt these types of innovations because the
benefits of adoption will not necessarily accrue to
them. 
Credit Constraint, Location, and Other Factors 
Any fixed investment requires the use of own or
borrowed capital.  Hence, the adoption of a non-divis-
ible technology, which requires a large initial invest-
ment, may be hampered by lack of borrowing capacity
(El-Osta and Morehart, 1999).  Location factors—such
as soil fertility, pest infestations, climate, and avail-
ability or access to information—can influence the
profitability of different technologies across different
farms.  Heterogeneity of the resource base has been
shown to influence technology adoption and prof-
itability (Green et al., 1996; Thrikawala et al., 1999).
Irrigation may also influence adoption.  Irrigation
generally increases yields and profitability and reduces
production risk.  However, irrigation may also increase
risk; for example,  it may encourage certain pest popu-
lations (Harper and Zilberman, 1989).  Contractual
arrangements for the production/marketing of the crop
are also believed to influence the adoption of certain
technologies.  Contracts often specify the acreage to
be grown or quantity and quality of product to be
delivered and may also require the application of
certain inputs and practices. 
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22Measures used included off-farm
income as a percentage of total house-
hold income (Ervin and Ervin, 1982)
or days (or hours) per year that the
operator worked off-farm (Fernandez-
Cornejo, 1996, 1998; Fernandez-
Cornejo and Jans, 1996). 
McNamara et al. (1991) used empirical evidence from peanut producers to
conclude that integrated pest management (IPM) required substantial time
for management and that off-farm employment may present a constraint to
IPM participation.  Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994), Fernandez-Cornejo
(1996, 1998), and Fernandez-Cornejo and Jans (1996) found similar results
for vegetable and fruit producers. Wozniack (1993) considered livestock
feeding innovations and showed that off-farm wage income was inversely
related to the likelihood of early adoption and acquiring information.22
More recent survey results show that operators of high-sales, large, and very
large farms—which depend on farm revenues more (and therefore less on
off-farm employment) than smaller farms—tend to adopt more manage-
ment-intensive technologies.  For example, around 18 percent of the opera-
tors of larger farms adopted precision farming in 1998. In contrast, only 3
percent of the operators of smaller farms (who worked more off-farm hours)
adopted precision farming (Hoppe, 2001).
Weaknesses of Early Studies 
While insightful, early studies failed to model the interaction of technology
adoption and off-farm employment decisions based on the underlying
economic theory and consistent with farmers’ optimization behavior.  Rather,
they simply included some measure of off-farm work as one explanatory
variable in the adoption decision.  Early studies also had some econometric
problems, such as not accounting for simultaneity of the off-farm work and
adoption decisions and the possibility of self-selection (see appendix 2).23
Finally, earlier studies did not examine the relationship between technology
adoption and household income from farm and off-farm sources. 
Modeling the Interaction Between Off-Farm
Work and Adoption Decisions
To address these issues, we examine the interaction of off-farm income-
earning activities and adoption of four agricultural technologies (see box, p.
22) of varying managerial intensity, including herbicide-tolerant crops
(Fernandez-Cornejo and Hendricks, 2003; Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2005),
precision agriculture (Fernandez-Cornejo and Southern, 2004), conservation
tillage (Fernandez-Cornejo and Gregory, 2004), and Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) corn (Fernandez-Cornejo and Gregory, 2004).  We also esti-
mated empirically the relationship between the adoption of these innova-
tions and farm household income from onfarm and off-farm sources.
For this purpose, we expanded the agricultural household model to include
the technology adoption decision together with the off-farm work participa-
tion decisions by the operator and spouse (appendix 2).24 We developed an
econometric model to examine the interaction of off-farm work and adop-
tion of agricultural technologies, as well as the impact of technology adop-
tion on farm household income (from onfarm and off-farm sources) after
controlling for such interaction (appendix 2).  The model used data from
nationwide surveys of corn and soybean farms in 2000-2001.  
23Self-selection occurs because farm-
ers are not assigned randomly into
groups (e.g., farmers that work off farm
or not, adopt or not) but make the
choices themselves. Therefore, group
members may be systematically differ-
ent, and these differences may manifest
themselves in farm performance and
could be confounded with differences
due purely to working off farm (or
adoption). This situation, called self-
selection, may bias the statistical results
unless it is corrected (appendix 2).  
24The agricultural household model
(Singh et al., 1986; Huffman, 1980,
1991; Lass et al., 1989; Lass and
Gempesaw, 1992; Kimhi, 1994, 2004)
combines in a single framework all
important economic decisions of the
farm household.We hypothesize that adoption of managerial-saving technologies (such as
herbicide-tolerant (HT) soybeans) frees up management time for use else-
where (notably off-farm employment), leading to higher off-farm income.  On
the other hand, managerially intensive technologies (such as precision agricul-
ture) would result in less time available for off-farm activities, leading to
lower off-farm income. 
It is also possible that farmers already working off farm may be more
disposed to adopt managerial-saving technologies.  This may lead to addi-
tional off-farm work and result in even higher off-farm income. Similarly,
farmers who are working off farm may be reluctant to adopt managerially
intensive technologies.25 
In either case, we anticipated that adoption of managerial-saving technolo-
gies would be associated with higher off-farm income and adoption of
managerially intensive technologies would be related to lower off-farm
income.  (In this report, we show only the empirical validity of the relation-
ship, but not the direction of the causality.)
A two-stage econometric estimation method was used to estimate the empir-
ical model (appendix 2). The first stage, the decision model, examines the
factors influencing off-farm work participation and technology adoption
decisions.  The second stage is used to estimate the relationship between
technology adoption and household income. 
Technology Adoption and
Off-Farm Income 
We find that the relationship between the adoption of herbicide-tolerant
(HT) soybeans and off-farm household income is positive and statistically
significant (table 7).  The elasticity of off-farm household income with
respect to the probability of adoption of HT soybeans (calculated at the
mean) is +1.59.26 That is, after controlling for other factors, a 15.9-percent
increase in off-farm household income is associated with a 10-percent
increase in the probability of adopting HT soybeans.  The adoption of HT
soybeans is also positively and significantly associated with total household
income (from off-farm and onfarm sources).  A 9.7-percent increase in total
household income is associated with a 10-percent increase in the probability
of adopting of HT soybeans.  On the other hand, adoption of herbicide-
tolerant soybeans did not have a significant relationship with household
income from farming (table 7).  
Results for adoption of conservation tillage are similar to those obtained for
HT soybeans, but of a lesser magnitude (table 7).  Controlling for other
factors, the association between the adoption of conservation tillage and off-
farm household income is positive and statistically significant (elasticity
+0.98). An increase in off-farm household income of 9.8 percent is associ-
ated with a 10-percent increase in the probability of adopting conservation
tillage. The association of adoption of conservation tillage and total house-
hold income (including both off-farm and onfarm sources) is positive and
statistically significant. The elasticity of total household income with respect
to the probability of adopting conservation tillage is +0.46.  
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25As Olfert observes: “Given the
nature of nonfarm jobs, where com-
mitments to specific timeframes are
frequently more precise than is the
case in farming, it is possible that a
nonfarm job receives first priority in
the allocation of time with farm pro-
duction undertaken as a second prior-
ity.” However, Olfert adds: “It may
also be the case that the decision
regarding time allocation to farm and
nonfarm work is made simultaneously
or that the off-farm employment deci-
sion influences the type and size of
farm that is optimal. Farm enterprises
that are less demanding in their com-
mitments may be chosen to permit
nonfarm employment. Knowing  the
time commitments required by the
nonfarm job, the farm size and type
will be organized to accommodate that
schedule. Similarly, given the nature of
labour requirements on the farm, a
choice will be made about the type
and amount of nonfarm work.”
26Results are expressed in terms of
elasticity—the percent change in a par-
ticular variable (e.g., household
income) relative to a small percent
change in adoption of the technology
from current levels, controlling for
other factors. The elasticity results can
be viewed in terms of the aggregate
change in a particular variable (across
an entire agricultural region or sector)
relative to aggregate increases in adop-
tion (as more and more producers adopt
the technology). However, in terms of a
typical farm —that has either adopted
or not— the elasticity is usually inter-
preted as the (marginal) farm-level
change associated with an increase in
the probability of adoption, away from
a given, or current, level of adoption.
As shown in appendix 2, the regression
model controls for farm location and
typology, operator age, education, and
experience, number of children, price
of the crop, a measure of specialization
on soybean/corn production, a measure
of the extent of livestock operations,
farm size, and proxies for local labor
market conditions. On the other hand, the relationship between the adoption of yield monitors
(an important component of precision agriculture) and off-farm household
income is negative and statistically significant (elasticity = -0.84) when we
control for other factors.  That is, a decrease in off-farm household income
by 8.4 percent is associated with a 10-percent increase in the probability of
adopting yield monitors. Adoption of yield monitors did not have a statisti-
cally significant association with either farm household income or total
household income. These results are quite different from those for HT
soybeans and conservation tillage.  This empirical evidence suggests that
yield monitoring techniques are management-intensive compared with the
other two technologies, which spare management time. 
Finally, the relationship between the adoption of Bt corn with either off-
farm or onfarm household income was not statistically significant, indi-
cating that Bt corn may be managerially neutral. 
These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence (see box “Selected
Agricultural …”) that herbicide-tolerant soybeans save managerial time
because of the simplicity and flexibility of weed control.  Conservation
tillage is also believed to save managerial labor, but to a lesser degree than
HT soybeans.  Our results for yield monitoring are also consistent with
anecdotal evidence that precision farming techniques in general are manage-
rially using.  Before the commercial introduction of Bt corn in 1996, most
farmers accepted yield losses rather than incur the expense and uncertainty
of chemical control.  For those farmers, the use of Bt corn was reported to
result in yield gains rather than pesticide savings, and savings in managerial
time were small.
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Table 7
Elasticities of farm household income with respect to the
probability of adopting technologies of differing managerial intensity 
With respect to adoption of:
Yield Bt corn1 Conservation Herbicide- 
Elasticity of monitors   tillage tolerant (HT)
soybeans
Onfarm household annual income 02 02 02 02
Off-farm household annual income  -0.84 02 +0.98 +1.59
Total household annual income   02 02 +0.46 +0.97
1Bt = Bacillus thuringiensis)
2Statistically insignificant underlying coefficient.  The underlying coefficients and their standard
errors are shown in appendix 2. 22
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Herbicide-tolerant (HT) soybeans contain traits that
allow them to survive certain herbicides that previ-
ously would have destroyed the crop along with the
targeted weeds. This allows farmers to use more effec-
tive postemergent herbicides, expanding weed
management options (Gianessi and Carpenter, 1999).
The most common herbicide-tolerant crops are
resistant to glyphosate, a herbicide effective on many
species of grasses, broadleaf weeds, and sedges.
Adoption of HT soybeans has risen rapidly since
commercial availability in 1996.  HT soybean use rose
quickly to about 17 percent of U.S. soybean acreage in
1997 and reached 87 percent in 2005 (Fernandez-
Cornejo and McBride, 2002; USDA, NASS, 2003).
Herbicide-tolerant soybeans save managerial time
because of the relative simplicity and flexibility of the
weed control program. The herbicide-tolerant tech-
nology allows growers to apply one herbicide product
over the soybean crop at any stage of growth, instead
of using several herbicides, to control a wide range of
weeds “without sustaining crop injury” (Gianessi and
Carpenter, 1999).  In addition, using HT soybeans is
said to make harvest easier (Duffy, 2001). 
Conservation tillage is defined as “any tillage or
planting system that maintains at least 30 percent of
the soil surface covered by residue after planting”
(Conservation Technology Information Center, 2004).
It includes no-till, ridge-till, and mulch-till techniques.
The impact of conservation tillage in controlling soil
erosion and soil degradation is well documented
(Edwards, 1995; Sandretto, 1997).  By leaving
substantial amounts of residue evenly distributed over
the soil surface, conservation tillage reduces soil
erosion by wind/water, increases water infiltration and
moisture retention, and reduces surface sediment and
chemical runoff.  Adoption of conservation tillage was
estimated at 2 percent of planted acreage in 1968 and
grew fastest during 1975-85, reaching nearly 28
percent in 1985 (Schertz, 1988). It reached about 37
percent of planted acreage in 2002 (Conservation
Technology Information Center, 2004). Conservation
tillage is used primarily to grow corn, soybeans, small
grains, and cotton.  
Conservation tillage is believed to save managerial
labor (Sandretto, 1997; USDA, 1998).  While it is
accepted that adoption of conservation tillage leads to
labor savings, its slower rate of adoption compared
with HT crops may be because the managerial savings
are less.  
Bt crops carry the gene from the soil bacterium
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) and are able to produce
proteins that are toxic to certain insects.  Bt corn, orig-
inally developed to control the European corn borer,
was planted on 35 percent of corn acreage in 2005, up
from 24 percent in 2002. The recent upswing may be
due to the commercial introduction in 2003/04 of a
new Bt corn variety that is resistant to the corn root-
worm.
Before the commercial introduction of Bt corn in
1996, chemical pesticide use was often not profitable
to control the European corn borer (ECB) and timely
application was difficult (Fernandez-Cornejo and
Caswell, 2006).  Many farmers accepted yield losses
rather than incur the expense and uncertainty of chem-
ical control.  For those farmers, the use of Bt corn
resulted in yield gains rather than pesticide savings,
and managerial time savings were minimal.    
Precision agriculture (PA) is often characterized as a
suite of technologies used to monitor and manage
subfield spatial variability.  It includes, for example,
global positioning systems, grid soil sampling, yield
monitors, and input applicators that can vary rates
across a field (Daberkow et al., 2002). These technolo-
gies can be used independently or as a package of
technologies that includes, for example, the use of grid
soil sampling, a variable-rate input applicator, and a
yield monitor.  PA has been growing relatively slowly.
Yield monitors, which provide farmers site-specific
data to allow them to vary input application and
production practices, are the most extensively adopted
PA component.  Yield monitors were used in about 33
percent of total corn acreage in 2001 and in about 25
percent of soybean acreage.  Adoption of other compo-
nents of PA is even slower. Adoption of variable-rate
applicators reached just 10 percent of corn acreage for
fertilizer and 3 percent for pesticides or seeds in 2001
(Daberkow et al., 2002).  
Unlike herbicide-tolerant soybeans, which provide
savings in management time (and therefore allow
operators to obtain higher income from off-farm activ-
ities), yield monitors (and precision agriculture in
general) are generally believed to be human capital-
intensive (Griffin at al., 2004). 
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Conclusions
As onfarm and off-farm activities compete for scarce managerial time in
U.S. farm operator households, economic decisions (including technology
adoption and other production decisions) are likely to shape and be shaped
by time allocation within the household.  Time allocation decisions are
usually not measured directly, but their outcomes, such as onfarm and off-
farm income, are observable. 
Our research finds that the farm-level efficiency of farm households
decreases as off-farm activities increase.  Smaller farms, which average the
highest off-farm incomes, obtain the lowest farm-level efficiencies. These
results support the hypothesis that farm operators who devote more time to
off-farm activities have less time to manage the farm.  However, examining
efficiency from a wider perspective, we find that household-level efficiency
(including off-farm income-generating activities) is higher across all farm
sizes than farm-level efficiency alone.  Moreover, the beneficial effect of
off-farm income is higher for smaller farms. In fact, farm households oper-
ating small farms achieve efficiency levels comparable to those operating
larger farms when off-farm income is included.  These results, therefore,
suggest that farm households operating small farms have adapted to short-
falls in farming performance by increasing off-farm income.
By including off-farm income-generating activities in the household output
portfolio (in addition to the traditional farm products), many farm house-
holds, especially those operating smaller farms, are able to enhance diversi-
fication.  The advantages of such diversification, measured by the
household-level economies of scope, are substantial.  These results suggest
that off-farm employment may enhance onfarm diversification, especially
for households operating small farms.
The economic inducement of smaller farms to increase their size (measured
by the economic concept of scale economies) is reduced when we include
off-farm income. Household-level scale economies (which include off-farm
income-generating activities) are closer to constant returns to scale than are
farm-level scale economies (which only consider the farm business).
However, the beneficial effect of off-farm activities in improving scale
economies is more pronounced for households operating smaller farms.
These findings provide a different way of measuring the role of off-farm
work in improving the economic condition of farm households, particularly
those operating small farms. 
The adoption of agricultural innovations is also linked to off-farm income
through managerial time. For example, the adoption of managerial time-
saving technologies is significantly related to higher off-farm household
income for U.S. corn/soybean farmers, after controlling for other factors. On
the other hand, managerially time-intensive technologies are associated with
significantly lower off-farm income. 
In a broader sense, these findings confirm the tradeoff between time spent
on farm and off-farm activities or, in economic terms, the substitution of
economies of scope (derived from engaging in multiple income-generating
activities, on and off the farm) for economies of scale.A number of implications follow.  Each of these implications reinforces the
importance of understanding farmers’ decisions in the context of the farm
household rather than the farm operation alone.  First, our research provides
empirical confirmation of Smith’s suggestion that households operating
small farms, which lack economies of scale, are more likely to devote time
to off-farm opportunities, more likely to adopt management-saving tech-
nologies (like herbicide-tolerant crops), and less likely to adopt manage-
ment-intensive technologies (such as integrated pest management). 
The relationship between off-farm work and economic performance also
suggests that a farm household’s dependence on off-farm income has an
effect on the distributional consequences of government policies. Govern-
ment policies affecting agriculture—such as conservation, research and
development, extension, and farm support—may affect farm households
differently depending on the relative importance of onfarm and off-farm
income-generating activities. Thus, the consequences of government policies
depend on the diversity of U.S. farm households, particularly regarding their
income sources.  For example, a policy promoting the adoption of manage-
ment-intensive agricultural techniques (such as IPM) may not be fully effec-
tive unless it takes into consideration the demands in managerial time
imposed by IPM adoption.
This research also has implications for private agricultural research and devel-
opment (R&D).   While innovators often base their economic evaluations of
returns to R&D on the expected profitability of potential innovations for
farmers (i.e., the extent of yield increases and/or input cost reduction resulting
from an innovation relative to the costs of adoption and current management
practices), this report shows that there is an important additional element to be
included in such evaluations: the value of management time. 
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Scope and Technical Efficiency
This discussion uses two different but related methodologies and data sets
and follows the analysis described in Nehring et al., 2005.  First, using
1996-2000 survey data, we use an input distance function to estimate scale
economies and technical efficiency, and compare these performance meas-
ures at the farm and household levels.  Second, using 2000 survey data, we
set up a multi-activity cost function to analyze labor allocation decisions
within the farm operator household and estimate scope economies.  We
interpret off-farm income-generating activities as outputs, along with corn,
soybeans, livestock, and other crops.  For both estimations, we use detailed
survey information of the farm operator household from USDA’s Agricul-
tural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).
Economies of Scale and Technical Efficiency 
The analysis of production structure and performance requires representing
the underlying multi-dimensional (input and output) production technology.
This may be formalized by specifying a transformation function,
T(X,Y,R)=0, which summarizes the production frontier in terms of an input
vector X, an output vector Y, and a vector of external production determi-
nants R.  This information on the production technology can also be charac-
terized via an input set, L(Y,R), representing the set of all X vectors that can
produce Y, given the exogenous factors R.
An input distance function (denoted by superscript I) identifies the least
input use possible for producing the given output vector, defined according
to L(Y,R): 
This multi-input, input-requirement function allows for deviations from the
frontier.  It is also conceptually similar to a cost function, if allocative effi-
ciency is assumed, in the sense that it implies minimum input or resource
use for production of a given output vector (and thus, implicitly, costs).
However, it does so in a primal/technical optimization or efficiency context,
with no economic optimization implied. 
For the farm-level model, the Y vector contains Y1 = crops (corn, soybeans,
and other crops), Y2 = livestock, and, for the household-level model, Y1 * =
crops and livestock, and Y2* = off-farm income-generating activities, as
farm “outputs.”  With Y2* included, one might think of Y as a multi-activity
rather than a multi-output vector.  The components of X are defined as X1 =
land (LD), X2 = hired labor (L), X3 = operator labor (including hours
worked off-farm)(K), X4 = spouse labor (including hours worked off-farm)
(E), X5 = capital (F), and X6 = materials (M). 
The scale economies measure may be computed from the estimated model
via derivatives or scale elasticities: -εDIY = -Σm∂ln DI(X,Y,t)/∂ln Ym = εX1Y
for M outputs Ym (similar to the treatment in Baumol et al. (1982) for a
multiple-output cost model, and consistent with the output distance function
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comparable to the cost literature, where the extent of increasing returns or
scale economies is implied by the shortfall of the measure from 1.  Again,
this measure is based on evaluation of (scale) expansion from a given input
composition base.  
The distance function can be approximated by a translog functional 
as follows: 
(2)   ln DI
it/X1,it = α0 + αt t + Σm αm ln X*mit +0.5 Σm Σn βmn ln X*mit ln X*nit 
+ Σk αk ln Ykit + 0.5 Σk Σl αkl ln Ykit ln Ylit + Σk Σm δkm ln Ykit ln X*mit , 
or
(3)   -ln X1,it = α0 + αt t + Σm αm ln X*mit+ 0.5 Σm Σn βmn ln X*mit ln X*nit 
+ Σk αk ln Ykit + 0.5 Σk Σl αkl ln Ykit ln Ylit + Σk Σm δkm ln Ykit ln X*mit - ln DI
it ,
where i denotes farm and t time period.  This functional relationship, which
embodies a full set of interactions among the X, Y and t arguments of the
distance function, can more succinctly be written as:  -ln X1,it = TL(X/X1, Y,
t) = TL(X*, Y, t). 
The input distance function is well-suited to measure technical efficiency.
For empirical estimation of technical efficiency, we append a symmetric error
term, v, to equation (3) and change the notation “- ln DI
it” to “u.” The
resulting function (with the subscripts it suppressed for notational simplicity)
is: -ln X1 = TL(X*, Y, t) + v - u, where the term (- u) may be interpreted as
inefficiency (as technical efficiency measures the distance from the frontier).
This method is known as a stochastic frontier production function, where
output of a firm is a function of a set of inputs, inefficiency (- u) and a
random error v (Aigner et al., 1977; Greene, 1995, 1997, 2000).  
To estimate the function, we used Coelli’s FRONTIER program (Coelli,
1996), based on the error components model of Battese and Coelli (1992).
Since -u represents inefficiency, the technical efficiency scores are given by
exp(-u)  = DI(X*,Y, t).  If a firm is not technically inefficient (the firm is on
the frontier), u is equal to 0 and its technical efficiency score is 1.
In the absence of genuine panel data, repeated cross-sections of data across
farm typologies are used to construct a pseudo-panel data set (see Deaton,
1985; Heshmati and Kumbhakar, 1992; Verbeek and Nijman, 1993). The
pseudo-panels are created by grouping the individual observations into a
number of homogeneous cohorts, demarcated on the basis of their common
observable time-invariant characteristics, such as location and ERS farm
typology.  The subsequent economic analysis then uses the cohort means
rather than the individual farm-level observations. ERS farm typology
categories are summarized in Nehring et al. (2005).  The resulting pseudo
panel data set consists of 13 cohorts by State, for 1996-2000, measured as
the weighted mean values of the variables to be analyzed.  There are a
total of 650 annual observations (130 per year), summarizing the activities
of 1,934 farms in 1996, 3,890 in 1997, 2,311 in 1998, 3,201 in 1999, and
2,394 in 2000.
37
Off-Farm Income, Technology Adoption, and Farm Economic Performance/ERR-36
Economic Research Service/USDAEconomies of Scope
When a firm produces more than one output, there is a qualitative change in
the production structure that makes the concept of economies of scale devel-
oped for a single output insufficient. For multiproduct firms, production
economies may arise not only because the size of the firm is increased but
also due to advantages derived from producing several outputs together
rather than separately. Thus, more than one measure is necessary to capture
the economies (or diseconomies) related to the scale of operation (volume
of output) and the economies related to the scope of the operation (composi-
tion of output or product mix). The concepts of economies of scale and
scope for multiproduct firms have been developed by Panzar and Willig
(1977, 1981) and Baumol et al. (1982).  They have been used in agriculture
by Akridge and Hertel (1986) and Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1992). 
Economies of scope measure the cost savings due to simultaneous produc-
tion relative to the cost of separate production.  In general, scope economies
occur when the cost of producing all products together is lower than
producing them separately.  
Formally, consider a partition of the output set N into two (disjoint) groups
T and N-T.  Let YT, YN-T be the output quantity (subvector) of each of the
two groups and YN (or simply Y) the output vector, which consists of all the
outputs.  The respective cost functions C(YT), C(YN-T) give the minimum
cost of producing the two output groups separately, and C(YN) denotes the
minimum cost of producing them together (Nehring et al., 2005).
The degree of economies of scope (SC) relative to the (output) 
set T is defined as:
(1) SC = [C(YT)+C(YN-T) - C(YN)] / C(YN)
where SC will be positive if there are economies of scope and negative if
there are diseconomies of scope.   In our case, we consider the first subset
of the partition to include the four conventional outputs (corn, soybeans,
other crops, and livestock), N={1,2,3,4} and the second subset the non-
conventional off-farm income-generating activities, N-T={5}. 
Farms that produce the two output groups separately are those that either
produce conventional outputs with no off-farm activities or else those with
off-farm work but no conventional outputs. While the sample includes farm
households that produce conventional outputs and no off-farm activities, it
technically does not include household with zero traditional outputs.
However, the sample does include many farm households with very small
revenues from traditional outputs because, for statistical purposes, a U.S.
farm is currently defined as “any place from which $1,000 or more of agri-
cultural products were sold or normally would have been sold during the
year under consideration.” (USDA, 2005).
The well-developed restricted cost function is used to estimate the scope
economies.  Consider n outputs, m variable inputs, and s fixed inputs and
other exogenous factors such as location or weather proxies; Y = (Y1,...Yn)’
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inputs, Z = (Z1,...Zs)’ is the vector of non-negative quasi-fixed inputs and
other (exogenous) factors, and W = (W1,...Wm)’ denotes the price vector of
variable inputs.  The restricted profit function is defined by: 
(3) C(W,Y,Z) = Min [W’ X : ∈ Τ ].
Under the usual assumptions on the tech  nology (production possibilities set
T), the restricted cost function is well defined and satisfies the usual regular-
ity conditions.  
Using a normalized quadratic variable cost function, which can be viewed as a
second-order Taylor series approximation to the true cost function, we obtain:
(4)
where W is a vector of normalized variable input prices, a0 is a scalar
parameter, and a, b, and c are vectors of constants of the same dimension
as W, Y, and Z.  The parameter matrices B, C, and H are symmetric and of
the appropriate dimensions.  Similarly, E, F, and G are matrices of
unknown parameters.
Using Shephard’s lemma, we obtain the demand functions for variable
inputs which is estimated together with the cost function.  We consider five
outputs Y (corn, soybeans, other crops, livestock, and operator and spouse
off-farm labor), five inputs X (hired labor, operator labor, spouse labor,
miscellaneous inputs, and pesticides), and use the pesticides price as the
numeraire. In addition the cost function is specified with two exogenous
factors (Nehring et al., 2005).
The normalized quadratic variable cost function and the four cost-share
equations are estimated in an iterated seemingly unrelated regression
(ITSUR) framework using data for year 2000. The adjusted R2’s were 0.99
for the quadratic cost function, 0.26 for the hired labor input, 0.21 for the
operator labor equation, 0.30 for the spouse labor equation, and 0.60 for the
miscellaneous inputs equation. However, 48 percent of coefficients for the
joint estimates are significant at the 10 percent level.
The own-price effects for the inputs exhibit the expected negative signs. The
own-price effect for hired labor is significant at the 10-percent level, while
the own-price effects for operator labor and spouse labor are not significant
in this cross-section. The own price elasticity of demand for hired labor is
highly elastic, with a value of -2.62. In contrast, the own- price elasticities
of demand for operator and spouse labor are highly inelastic, with values of
-0.105 and -0.283.  These results, however, are not directly comparable with
cost function studies in the literature that do not include off-farm income-
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Appendix 2—Incorporating Technology
Adoption in the Farm Household Model
The Theoretical Framework
This model combines in a single framework the technology adoption and
off-farm work decisions by the operator and spouse and follows the analysis
developed by Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2005).  The model expands the farm
household model offered by Huffman (1991) with several additions to allow
for technology adoption.  According to the agricultural household model,
farm households maximize utility U subject to income, production tech-
nology, and time constraints. Household members receive utility from goods
purchased for consumption G, leisure (including home time) L= (Lo, Ls) for
the operator and the spouse, and from factors exogenous to current house-
hold decisions, such as human capital H = (Ho, Hs), and other factors Ψ
(including household characteristics and weather).  Thus:
(1) Max U= U(G, L, H, Ψ)
Subject to the constraints:
(2)  Pg G = PqQ – Wx X’ + WM’+ A    (income constraint)
(3) Q = Q[X(Γ), F(Γ), H, Γ, R],  Γ≥0 (technology constraint)
(4) T = F(Γ)+ M + L, M ≥ 0 (time constraint)
where Pg and G denote the price and quantity of goods purchased for
consumption; Pq and Q represent the price and quantity of farm output; Wx
and X are the price and quantity (row) vectors of farm inputs; W = (Wo, Ws)
represents off-farm wages paid to the operator and spouse;  M = (Mo,  Ms) is
the amount of time working off-farm by the operator and spouse; F = (Fo,
Fs) is the amount of time working on the farm by the operator and spouse; A
is other income, including income (from interest, dividends, annuities,
private pensions, and rents) and government transfers (such as Social Secu-
rity, retirement, disability, and unemployment); R is a vector of exogenous
factors that shift the production function, and T = (To, Ts) denotes the
(annual) time endowments for the operator and spouse.  The production
function is concave and has the usual regularity characteristics.  Some tech-
nologies offer simplicity and flexibility that translate into reduced manage-
ment time, freeing time for other uses.  In these cases, the amount of time
working on the farm by the operator and the spouse F (and possibly the use
of other farm inputs X) is a function of Γ, the adoption intensity (extent of
adoption) of the technology.  A technology-constrained measure of (cash)
household income is obtained by substituting (3) into (2) (Huffman, 1991):
(5)     Pg G = Pq Q[X(Γ), F(Γ), H, Γ, R] – Wx X(Γ)’ + W M’+ A  
The first order conditions for optimality (Kuhn-Tucker conditions) are
obtained by maximizing the Lagrangian expression L over (G, L) and mini-
mizing it over the Lagrange multipliers (λ,μ), where μ = (μ0’, μs):(6)   L = U(G, L, H, Ψ) + λ { Pq Q[ X(Γ), F(Γ), H, Γ, R] – Wx X(Γ)’
+WM ’+ A - Pg G } + μ [T - F(Γ)-  M - L]
The off-farm participation and adoption decisions may be obtained from the
following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(7)         ∂L/∂X = λ (Pq ∂Q/∂X - Wx) = 0
(8)         ∂L/∂F = λ Pq ∂Q/∂F  – μ = 0
(9)      ∂L/∂Γ = λ{Pq[(∂Q/∂X)(dX/dΓ)’+(∂Q/∂F)(dF/dΓ)’+∂Q/dΓ]- Wx
(dX/dΓ)’} - μ (dF/dΓ)’ ≤ 0,
Γ≥ 0,  Γ≅   ∂L/∂Γ = 0
(10)         ∂L/∂M = λ W –  μ ≤ 0,  M ≥ 0,  M(λ W –  μ ) = 0
(11a, b)   ∂L/∂G = UG - Pg λ = 0, ∂L/∂L = UL - μ = 0
(12)          Pq Q[ X(Γ), F(Γ), H, Γ, R] – Wx X(Γ)’ + WM’ + A - Pg G = 0
(13)          T - F(Γ) - M - L = 0
where UL, UG are the partial derivatives of the function U.  Without loss of
generality, both the operator and spouse are assumed to have positive
optimal hours of leisure and farm work, i.e., equation (8) and (11b) are
equalities. 
The off-farm participation decision conditions for the operator and the
spouse may be obtained from the optimality conditions for off-farm work,
equation (10), together with equations (8) and (11b):
(14) W ≤ μ/λ = Pq ∂Q/∂F
where μ/λ is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption goods (from equations 11a and 11b) and Pq ∂Q/∂F repre-
sents the value of the marginal product of farm labor for the operator and
the spouse.  Examining the components of (14), Wi < μi /λ (strict
inequality) indicates that the total time endowment for the operator (i = o)
or spouse (i = s) is allocated between farm work and leisure; optimal hours
of off-farm work are zero (corner solution), i.e., Mi* = 0.   On the other
hand, if Wi = μi /λ,  optimal hours of off-farm work may be positive (Mi* >
0) and Wi = μi /λ = Pq ∂Q/∂Fi (interior solution) (Lass et al., 1989;
Huffman, 1991; Kimhi, 1994; Huffman and El-Osta, 1997).  In this case,
the value of the marginal product of farm labor is equal to the off-farm
wage rate.27
When an interior solution for M occurs, equations (7) and (8) can be solved
together, independently of the rest of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, to obtain
the demand functions for onfarm labor, i.e., the optimal production and
consumption decisions can be separated since the off-farm wage determines
the value of the operator’s and spouse’s time (W = μ/λ ) (Huffman and
Lange, 1989; Huffman, 1991).28
28Moreover, when an interior solu-
tion occurs, from (10), (11a), and
(11b) we obtain UL/UG =W/Pg; that is,
the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption goods and leisure
is equal to the ratio of the wage rate and
the price of consumption goods. 
27The marginal value of time of the
farm operator (or spouse) when all
his/her time is allocated to farm work
and leisure and none is allocated to
off-farm work (Pq ∂Q/∂Fi |Mi = 0)
represents the shadow value of farm
labor and is called the reservation
wage for off-farm work for the opera-
tor (i = o) or spouse (i = s).  In this
context, the operator (or spouse) will
work off-farm when his/her reservation
wage is less than the anticipated off-
farm wage rate and will not work off-
farm otherwise.  Assuming that both
the operator and spouse face wages
that are dependent on their marketable
human capital characteristics ξi , local
labor market conditions, and job char-
acteristics Ω, but not on the amount of
off-farm work (Huffman and Lange,
1989; Huffman, 1991; Tokle and
Huffman, 1991), the off-farm market
labor demand functions are Wi = Wi
(ξi, Ω ), (i = o, s).
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The demand function for onfarm labor is then F*=F(W, Wx , Pq, H, Γ, R)
and the demand for purchased farm inputs X* = X(W, Wx , Pq, H, Γ, R).
These optimal input demand functions are substituted in the production
function to obtain the supply of farm output Q* = S(W, Wx , Pq, H, Γ, R)
and the maximum net household income may be expressed as:  
(15)  NI* = Pq S(W, Wx , Pq, H, Γ, R) – Wx X*’ + WM’ + A
Solving jointly equations (10), (11), and (15) we obtain the demand for
leisure L* = L(W, Pg, NI*, H, Ψ, T) and for consumption goods G = G(W,
Pg, NI*, H, Ψ, Γ, T).  The supply function for off-farm time is obtained by
substitution of the optimal levels of leisure hours and farm work hours
(Huffman, 1991): 
(16) M* = T – F* – L*   = M(W, Wx, Pq, Pg, NI*, H,Ψ,Γ, ξi, Ω, R, T )
Finally, a reduced-form expression of total household income is obtained by:  
(17) NI* = NI(Wx, Pq , Pg , A,  H, Ψ,Γ, R, T)
As Huffman (1991) notes, when optimal hours of off-farm work hours for
the operator or the spouse are zero, the decision process is not recursive and
production and consumption decisions must be made jointly.  In this case,
the arguments for the reduced-form expression of household income are the
same as those in (17) but exclude the exogenous variables related to the job
characteristics and labor marketability.
The technology adoption decision condition is obtained from the optimality
conditions, equation (9) and equations (8) and (11b), noting that the expres-
sion in brackets in (9) is the total derivative dQ/dΓ. Thus, we obtain:
(18) Pq dQ/dΓ - Wx (dX/dΓ)’ - (μ/λ)(dF/dΓ)’ ≤ 0
But from (11a) and (11b) μ/λ = Pg (UL/UG ); then:
(19)                  Pq dQ/Γ - Wx (dX/dΓ)’- Pg (UL/UG )(dF/dΓ)’ ≤ 0
The left-hand-side of this expression may be interpreted as the marginal benefit
of adoption Pq dQ/dΓ minus the marginal cost of adoption, which includes the
marginal cost of the production inputs Wx (dX/dΓ)’ and the marginal cost of
the farm work Pg (UL/UG)(dF/dΓ)’ (of the operator and the spouse) brought
about by adoption (could be negative if  adoption saves managerial time),
valued at the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
goods (which, when off-farm work hours are positive, equals the off-farm wage
rate).  It will not be optimal to adopt if the inequality is strict (corner solution),
wherein the marginal benefit of adoption falls short of the marginal cost of
adoption.  An interior solution for the optimal extent of adoption will occur
when the equality is strict or when the value of the marginal benefit of adop-
tion is equal to the marginal cost of adoption.  
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, one can use the implicit func-
tion theorem to derive expressions for off-farm labor supply for farm oper-
ator and spouse and technology adoption (which affects off-farm laborsupply of farm operators and spouses) that are functions of wages, prices,
human capital, nonlabor income, and other exogenous factors.  These
factors are replaced in reduced-form representations of labor supply and
adoption by observable farm, operator, and household characteristics,
including human capital.  The “ambient variables” (family size, access to
urban areas), which might affect the productive capacity of the farm oper-
ator and the spouse, are also included.  The following section outlines the
empirical model and estimation method used to conduct the analysis.
Empirical Model
A two-stage econometric model is specified.  The first stage, the decision
model, examines the off-farm work participation and the technology adop-
tion decisions.  The second stage is used to estimate the impact of adoption
on household income.  
A simplified “reduced form” approach is followed (Goodwin and Holt,
2002; Goodwin and Mishra, 2004) to specify the empirical model, rather
than explicitly estimating a structural model of labor supply. In this
approach, the reduced form of the decision model is obtained by specifying
the endogenous variables (M, F, Qg, X) in terms of the exogenous variables,
including Wx, Pq, Pg,  H, Ψ, ξi, Ω, R, T.  Equation (14), implied by the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, is central to the off-farm work decision of the
operator and the spouse and equation (19) is central to the adoption deci-
sion.  Thus, considering a first-order approximation (linear terms) and
adding the stochastic terms, the empirical representation of the decision
model, which includes the off-farm participation of the operator (20a) and
spouse (20b), and the technology adoption decision (20c), is: 
(20a)   βo Zo’ + εo ≤ 0
(20b) βs Zs’ + εs ≤ 0
(20c) βa Za’ + εa ≤ 0
where the (row) vectors Zo, Zs, and Za include all the factors or attributes influ-
encing linearly the off-farm participation (operator and spouse) and adoption
decisions, and βo, βs, and βa are vectors of parameters.  Assuming that the
stochastic disturbances are normally distributed, each of these equations may
be estimated by probit.  However, because the disturbances (εo , εs, εa) are
likely to be correlated, univariate probit equations are not appropriate.
Bivariate probit models have been used to model the off-farm employment
decisions by the operator and spouse (Huffman and Lange, 1989; Lass et al.,
1989; Tokle and Huffman, 1991).  Since the decisions to work off farm and the
technology adoption decision may be related, all three decisions are modeled
together in a multivariate probit model (Greene, 1997).  Formally, [εo , εs, εa] ~
trivariate normal (TVN) [0,0,0;1,1,1; ρ12,ρ13,ρ23], with variances ρij (i =j)
equal to 1 and correlations ρij (i ≠ j) where i, j = 1,2,3. 
The joint estimation of three or more probit equations was computationally
unfeasible until recently because of the difficulty in evaluating high-order
multivariate normal integrals. Over the past decade, however, the estimation
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al., 1994; Greene, 1997).
The vector Zi includes (i) farm factors, such as farm size and complexity of
the operations; (ii) human capital (operator age/experience and education);
(iii) household characteristics (such as the number of children); (iv) off-farm
employment opportunities, which will depend on the farms’ accessibility to
urban areas and the change in the rate of unemployment in nearby urban
areas; (v) farm typology; and (vi) government payments.29 The factors or
attributes influencing adoption, included in the vector Za, are farm factors,
human capital, farm typology,  a proxy for risk (risk-averse farmers are less
likely to adopt agricultural innovations),  and crop/seed prices.
The second stage, the income impact model, provides estimates of the
impact of adoption on household income after controlling for other factors.
The empirical representation of this model—based on equation (17), the
reduced-form expression of household income—is NI* = NI(Wx, Pq, Pg , A,
H, Ψ, Γ, R, T).
After linearizing this reduced form, separating out explicitly the adoption
indicator variable, and appending a random disturbance å, assumed to be
normally distributed, we have: 
(21) NI* = θV’ + α I + ε
where NI* represents household income; V is a (row) vector of observable
explanatory variables that may influence household income (other than tech-
nology adoption) such as prices, human capital, and “ambient variables”
(family size, access to urban areas) that may affect the productive capacity
of the farm operator and the spouse; I is an indicator variable for adoption
(I=1 if adoption takes place and I=0 otherwise); and θ and α are appropri-
ately dimensioned parameters.  The impact of adoption on household
income is measured by the estimate of the parameter α.  However, as noted
by Stefanides and Tauer (1999), if α is to measure the impact of adoption on
income of a representative farm, farmers should be randomly assigned
among adopter and nonadopter categories.  This is not the case, since
farmers make the adoption choices themselves. Therefore, adopters and
nonadopters may be systematically different and these differences may
manifest themselves in farm performance and could be confounded with
differences due purely to adoption. This situation, called self-selection, may
bias the statistical results unless corrected (Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 2002).  
To correct for self-selection bias, we follow Maddala (1983) and Greene
(1995) and obtain consistent estimates of the parameters θ and α by
regarding self-selection and simultaneity (discussed earlier) as sources of
endogenity.  Because the dummy variable I cannot be treated as exogenous,
instrumental variable techniques are used to purge the dependence of I.  The
predicted probability of adoption, obtained from the decision model, is used
as an instrument for I in equation (21).
Unlike the traditional selectivity model, in which the effects are calculated
(separately) using the subsamples of adopters and nonadopters, the impact
model uses all the observations and is known as a “treatment effects model,”
29Following Goodwin and Holt
(2002), some prices are not included
in our empirical models since prices
are approximately constant across
households when data consist of cross-
sectional observations taken at a point
in time. We did include some prices,
like the price of soybeans, but its coef-
ficient was statistically insignificant.
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regression Y = θV′+ α I + ε where the observed indicator variable I (I = 1
if I* > 0 and I = 0 if I* ≤ 0), indicates the presence or absence of some
treatment (adoption of herbicide-tolerant crops in this case) and the unob-
served or latent variable I* is given by I* = δ Za′ + ν(Greene, 1995). 
Total household income (NI*), as represented in (17), has two components:
household income from farming (FARMHHI) and off-farm household
income (TOTOFI).  Household income from farming includes farm business
household income, operator’s paid farm income, household members’ paid
farm income, etc. (see detailed definitions in appendix table 1).  Off-farm
household income includes off-farm business income, income from oper-
ating other farm businesses, off-farm wages and salaries, etc. 
The components of vector V include farm location and typology, operator
age, education and experience, number of children, price of soybeans, a
measure of specialization on soybean production, a measure of the extent of
livestock operations, farm size, and proxies for local labor market conditions.
The data are obtained from the nationwide Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey (ARMS) developed by USDA (USDA, ERS, 2003). The
ARMS survey is designed to link data on the resources used in agricultural
production to data on use of technologies, other management techniques,
chemical use, yields, and farm financial/economic conditions for selected
field crops.  The ARMS is a multiframe, probability-based survey in which
sample farms are randomly selected from groups of farms stratified by
attributes such as economic size, type of production, and land use. 
The 2000 data set (used for the HT soybean and Bt corn case study) includes
17 soybean (corn) producing States: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
After selecting those farms that planted soybeans (corn) in 2000 and elimi-
nating those observations with missing data, there were 2,258 observations
available for the soybean analysis and 2513 observations for corn.  
The 2001 corn data set (used for the yield monitor and conservation tillage
case studies) includes observations of 17 corn-producing States. After elimi-
nating observations with missing data, there were 1,763 observations avail-
able for analysis.
Because of the complexity of the survey design, a weighted least-squares tech-
nique is used to estimate the parameters using full-sample weights developed
by the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service. Standard errors are
estimated using a delete-a-group jackknife method (Kott, 1998; Kott and
Stukel, 1997) where a group of observations is deleted in each replication.  The
sample is partitioned into r groups of observations (r = 15) and resampled, thus
forming 15 replicates and deleting one group of observations in each replicate.
Appendix table 2 shows the parameter estimates α (equation 21) along with
standard errors. These parameters may be interpreted as the derivatives of
household income with respect to the probability of adoption and are used
to obtain the elasticities shown in table 7.
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Appendix table 1
Household (HH) income variable definitions
1. Household income from farming (FARMHHI) =  Farm Business Income HH Share 
+  Operator Paid on Farm 
+  Household Members Paid on Farm 
+  Net Income from Rented Land 
Where:  
Farm Business Income HH Share  =  Net Cash Farm Business Income  
-  Depreciation  
-  Gross Income from Rented Land 
-  Operator Paid Onfarm 
-  Income Due to Other Households
Net Cash Farm Income = Gross Cash Farm Income - Cash Operating Expenses
Gross Cash Farm Income = Crop and livestock income including CC loans + Other farm income (includes government
payments, income from custom work and machine hire, income from livestock grazing, other farm-related income, income from
farm land rented to others, fee income from crops removed under production contract, fee income from livestock removed under
production contract). 
Total Cash Operating Expenses (hired labor, contract labor, seed, fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, supplies, tractor and other
equipment leasing, repairs, custom work, general business, real estate and property taxes, insurance, interest, purchased feed,
purchased livestock). 
2. Off-Farm Household Income (TOTOFI) =   Off-farm business income
+  Income from operating other farm businesses
+  Off-farm wages and salaries
+  Interest and dividend income
+  Other off-farm income
+  Rental income
3.  Total Household Income (TOTHHI)  =  Household Income from Farming (FARMHHI) 
+   Off-Farm Household Income (TOTOFI)
Appendix table 2
Parameter estimates of probability of adoption term of the household income equation for 
technologies of varying managerial intensity 
Yield  monitors     Bt corn Conservation Herbicide-tolerant 
tillage soybean
Estimate  std. err. t-valueE stimate std. err. t-valueE stimate std. err. t-valueE stimate std. err. t-value
Onfarm household annual income 25.1 63.8 (0.39) -13.9 10.9 (-1.29) 6.4 49.5 (0.13)- 30.4  29.8 (-1.02) 
Off-farm household annual income  -124.9 35.3 (-3.54) -36.7 36.2 (-1.07) 87.33 0.3 (2.88)   133.4  67.0  (1.99)
Total household annual income           -100.8 68.7 (-1.47) -50.6 36.5 (-1.39) 93.9 51.3 (1.83)   104.1  59.0  (1.76) 
Note.  Standard errors calculated using the delete-a-group jackknife method.